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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:
\

Appeal No. 20061016-CA

DAVID MARK RODRIGUEZ
Defendant/Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
L

NO MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED
WHEN ATTACKING THE COURT'S CONCLUSION
In its Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that Appellant did not

meet the requirements to marshal the evidence. Brief of Appellee at p. 5. The
State is mistaken in this argument.
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) states in pertinent part that, "[a] party challenging
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding." Ibid, (emphasis added). In State v. Curry, the standard for reviewing the
denial of a motion to suppress is stated as follows, "[t]his Court reviews the
'factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence' under a 'clearly-erroneous standard,' and this Court reviews
the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness." Ibid. 2006 UT App 390, | 5 ,
147 P.3d 483, citing State v. Peterson. 2003 UT App 300, 1 7, 77 P.3d 646

(quotations and citation omitted), ajfd, 2005 UT 17, 110 P.3d 699. However, this
Court "afford[s] no deference to the trial court's application of the law to the
underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases." Id., see also State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699.
Marshaling may be required in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
presented at trial as they pertain to the facts found by the trial court, however, no
such requirements exists and the State cites to no authority respecting marshaling
in a challenge to a trial court's erroneous denial of a suppression motion under the
Fourth Amendment. Should Rodriguez's argument be construed by this Court as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at the hearing on the Motion, however,
and it be determined that marshaling is necessary, the Statement of Facts set forth
in Rodriguez's opening brief adequately set forth all the evidence presented by the
three (3) witnesses in this matter and Rodriguez's threshold requirement for
marshaling has thus been met.
The Utah Supreme Court recently undertook an extensive analysis that
lends support for Rodriguez's position that marshaling should not be required as it
pertains to the issues raised by Rodriguez in his opening brief in this matter, since
the challenges contained therein pertain to the trial court's determination as to
whether reasonable suspicion existed with respect to the stop of Rodriguez's
vehicle by Adams. The Utah Supreme Court's analysis pertained to the standard
of review appropriate for such determination, stating as follows:
At issue in rState v. Pena,] was the proper standard by which to
review a trial court's determination of whether a police stop was
?

supported by reasonable suspicion. [Ibid, 869 P.2d 932, 934-35
(Utah 1994)]. The issue presented a classic mixed question of law
and fact. Id. The circumstances surrounding Mr. Pena's detention
were factual. Id. The concept of reasonable suspicion was legal. Id.
The application of the reasonable suspicion standard to the
circumstances of Mr. Pena's detention intertwined both elements. Id.
at 936.
The focus of our inquiry in Pena was where to place the reasonable
suspicion inquiry on the fact versus law continuum. Id. at 939.
Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, Tf75-76, 130 P.3d 325. In Pena. the Utah
Supreme Court specifically stated that, "[w]e conclude that the proper standard of
review to be applied to a trial court determination of whether a specific set of facts
gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being a fact determination
reviewable for clear error." Pena at 939. The Court adopted a four-part test in
Pena for determinations as to the standards of review for mixed questions of fact
and law; however, the test was later found to be confusing and a new test was
recently adopted in State v. Levin. 2006 UT 50, f25, 144 P.3d 1096, as follows:
Our revised test considers the following factors: (1) the degree of
variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal
rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, "such as a witness's
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that
cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate
courts;" and (3) other "policy reasons that weigh for or against
granting discretion to trial courts."
Ibid
As it pertains to the first Levin factor pertaining to the degree of variety and
complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied, ". . .the greater the
3

complexity and variety of the facts, the stronger the case for appellate deference."
Levin at f26. The facts favorable to a conclusion that a level-2 Terry stop has
occurred requiring an officer to have reasonable suspicion to stop are that Adams
pulled his car in front of Rodriguez's, made a visual gesture with his hand to stop,
all the while intending to try and stop him, drove up beside Rodriguez and rolled
his window down to speak with Rodriguez. Since some of the facts, if found to be
a lawful command of a police officer, could likely have resulted in a third degree
felony charge for Rodriguez if he chose to ignore them.

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-

6a-209(l)(a). These facts appear to be particular to this matter since counsel
herein was unable to locate much case law on these particular facts, which
evidence their complexity and support appellate deference.
"As to the second [factor], the greater the importance of a trial court's
credibility assessments that cannot be adequately reflected in the record, the
stronger the case for appellate deference." Levin at f26. Although the parties'
accounts of what occurred differ in this matter, giving rise to credibility
determinations, the issue challenged before this Court does not hinge on the
credibility determination.

Rodriguez has adopted the facts as sufficient and

challenges the trial court's conclusions of law that the encounter was a level-1
Terry stop, even with the facts as found by the trial court.
As it pertains to the third Levin factor, the Utah Court of Appeals set forth
as follows:
The third factor requires that we take into consideration policy
factors related to the degree of deference that should be applied.
A

Even where a case for appellate deference is strong under the first
two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless lead us to limit
that deference.
There exist no policy considerations that relate to the degree of deference that
should be applied in the instant matter. Thus, no policy considerations would lead
this Court to limit the deference it may otherwise exercise in mixed questions on
review. Having sufficiently met the Levin factors evidencing that the instant
matter as a challenge to the conclusions of law, not requiring marshaling, and
requiring a standard of review conducive to Pena, supra, the matter can clearly be
determined by this Court under a correctness standard.
As indicated supra, Rodriguez adopted the finding of the facts as presented
in this matter and articulated them in detail in the Statement of Facts section found
on pages 10-11 of the opening brief. Rodriguez is arguing against the trial court's
conclusion that his encounter with Adams was a level one (1) Terry encounter. In
order for the Appellant to make his argument against the trial court's conclusion it
was necessary for him to reargue the evidence showing how the encounter was not
a level one stop.
As is stated supra under UTAH .R .APP. P. 24(a)(9), marshaling the
evidence is only necessary when challenging a finding of fact, (emphasis added).
The findings of fact in this matter are not being challenged, only the conclusions
made by the trial court. Therefore, because it is the conclusions which the
Appellant is challenging and not the finding of fact marshaling was not required.
IL

DEPUTY ADAMS STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS A
SEIZURE
5

The United States Supreme Court has held that stopping a vehicle and etaining it
occupants constitutes a seizure, stating as follows:
"[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a
'seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth]
Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648,
653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); accord State v.
Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App.1992); see Terry v. Ohio .
392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
(defining Fourth Amendment seizure as "whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away").
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276, (Utah App.,1994). "[A] seizure under the
fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave." State v. Jackson, 805
P.2d 765, 767, (Utah App. 1990) citing. United States v. MendenhalL 446 U.S.
544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
"A person is seized only when that person has an objective reason to
believe he or she is not free to end the conversation with the officer and proceed
on his or her way." United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th
Cir.1996). The defendant's subjective belief that she was not free to leave is not
determinative. "The correct test is whether a reasonable person in [the defendant's]
position would believe [she] was not free to leave." Id. at 1499. U.S. v. TorresGuevara. 147 F.3d 1261, C.A.10 (Utah), 1998.
UTAH CODE ANN.§

41-6a-209(l)(a) clearly states that, "[a] person may not

willfully fail or willfully refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of a;
(a) peace officer." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6a-210 states in part: "An operator who

receives a visual or audible signal jfrom a peace officer to bring the vehicle to a
stop may not: (i) operate the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so
as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or (ii)
attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means, (emphasis
added).
While the lesser offense of disobeying a peace officer requires
"willful" conduct in order to meet the requisite level of culpability
under section 41-6-13, (now 41-6a-209) the greater offense of
fleeing or eluding a peace officer requires "willful or wanton
disregard" on the part of the driver in order to violate section 41-613.5. "Wanton" is not defined for purposes of this statute, but it is
commonly thought of as "[rjeckless, heedless, malicious;
characterized by extreme recklessness or foolhardiness; recklessly
disregardful of... consequences." Black's Law Dictionary 1582 (6th
ed. 1990). Our supreme court addressed the meaning of the phrase
"wanton or reckless disregard" as it appeared in a criminal statute.
See State v. Johnson. 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 1019 (1961).
According to Johnson, the phrase "connotes the generally accepted
meaning of 'criminal negligence.' " Id. at 221, 364 P.2d at 1019.
Under section 76-2-103(4) of the Utah Code, a person is criminally
negligent "when he ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances [surrounding his conduct]
exist or the result [of his conduct] will occur." UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-2-103(4) (1990).
State v.Simpson. 904 P.2d 709, 713, (Utah App. 1995).
In the instant matter, Adams stop of Rodriguez constituted a seizure.
Adams saw the Rodriguez vehicle, was "curious" and decided to check it out, and
headed down the road. Adams pulled his patrol car up alongside Rodriguez, made
a gesture with his hand that was a raise of his hand with the palm facing upward,
had his window down, began speaking to Rodriguez, and got out of his vehicle to
do so. It is apparent that, because Adams waved at Rodriguez and had his window
7

rolled down as he approached the vehicle, he intended to have Rodriguez stop so
he could speak with him.
At the hearing on the suppression motion in this matter, Adams testified
that he '*waved to see if he was going to stop. Some people just go by. I was going
to just see if everything was all right." Tr. at p 14. When asked to show how he
waved, the officer demonstrated holding up his hand with his palm upward. Tr. at
p. 15. It is clear by Adams' testimony that he made a visual signal to Rodriguez
and that it was his intention for Rodriguez to stop based on that visual signal.
Rodriguez stopped based upon that signal and spoke to Adams and Rodriguez did
not feel like he could just end the conversation and be on his way. As is stated
supra in UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6a-210, a person who receives a visual signal from
a police officer is required to stop or they may be charged with a third degree
felony. Under the law, Rodriguez was required to stop when he was waved at by
Adams.
At the hearing on the suppression motion in this matter, the trial court
concluded that the testimony of Adams was more credible.

The trial court

assumed that, if someone was stopped by a police officer, the first thing they
would say is "why was I stopped?" and not just provide an explanation that they
were okay and just getting some water. The trial court did not believe it was a
level two Terry stop and did not believe that Adams had blocked their lane of
travel; however, it did concede that Adams may have, at most, crossed their lane
of traffic and then pulled up side by side with them. Tr. at pp. 48-50. The trial

court indicated that they believed that Adams only raised his hand at Rodriguez
and did nothing more. Id.
"There is no bright line test for determining if reasonable suspicion exists.
State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991). Rather, courts must look at
the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109
S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Accord State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825,
827; Steward. 806 P.2d at 215. State v. Potter. 863 P.2d 40, (Utah App.,1993).
However, when making its ruling in this matter, the trial court did not look at the
totality of the circumstances pertaining to the reasonable person issue. Adams
crossing their lane of travel for even a fraction of a second, to pull up alongside
them, evidences that he blocked their lane of travel as they were trying to leave,
requiring them to stop. As he pulled up alongside Rodriguez's vehicle, he made a
visual gesture with his hand as if to stop him and engaged Rodriguez in
conversation. It is clear that this matter was a seizure since a reasonable person
would not feel as though they could drive off based upon the totality of the facts
surrounding the stop that occurred in this matter.
The trial court also concluded that they felt as though Adams raised hand
was like an officer knocking on a door to see if someone is suspected of growing
marijuana. The court concluded that any citizen can knock on your door to see if
you are growing marijuana or pull up beside your vehicle and that if any citizen
can do that so can police officers. However, the trial court erred in its conclusion,
since police officers are held to a different standard than are normal citizens.

Police officers may be able to approach you on the street and ask you a few
questions or do a pat-down search, however, they are precluded jfrom stopping a
vehicle without the requisite reasonable suspicion, A lack of reasonable suspicion
in this regard warrants exercise of the exclusionary rule set forth in the U.S.
CONST. AMEND IV.

III.

State v. Fridleifson. 2002 UT App 322, 18, 57 P.3d 1098.

RODRIGUEZ DID NOT FEEL FREE TO LEAVE AFTER HE
STOPPED, MAKING THIS A LEVEL TWO ENCOUNTER

In State v. Tehero, this Court held as follows:
Under our case law, there are three permissible levels of police
stops:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and
pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained
against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause
to believe an offense had been committed or is being
committed.5'
State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, If 10 n. 1, 112 P.3d 507 (omission in
original) (quotations and citation omitted). A level one encounter is
a voluntary encounter during which a citizen may choose to answer a
police officer's questions but is free to leave at any time during the
questioning. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 11, 998
P.2d 274. " As long as the person remains free to disregard the
questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require
some particularized and objective justification.9 " Id. {quoting State
v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct.App.1990)) (additional
quotations and citation omitted). In contrast, a person is seized in a
level two stop, and thus afforded the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, when the officer by means of physical force or show of
authority has in some way restrained the liberty of [the] person."
(quotations and citations omitted). A level one encounter becomes a
level two seizure when "a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. This is
10

true even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention brief." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Circumstances demonstrating that a level two stop is underway
include the presence of more than one officer, the display of an
officer's weapon, physical touching of the person, use of
commanding language or tone of voice, and retaining a person's
identification or other documentation. See id.
Ibid, 2006 UT App 419 f6, 147 P.3d 506. This Court has also indicated as
follows:
A level two stop occurs when, in an encounter between a citizen and
law enforcement officers, " 'a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave.' " State
v. Rav, 2000 UT App 55,f 11, 998 P.2d 274 (quoting State v.
Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct.App.1990)). Such a detention is
constitutionally permissible when the officer has reasonable
suspicion to believe a person "has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, - - , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 LJEd.2d 740 (2002).
State v. Fridleifson. 2002 UT App 322,18, 57 P.3d 1098. In State v. Fridleifson.
this Court stated as follows with respect to the requisite reasonable suspicion
necessary in a level two stop:
[A] level two stop ... must be supported by reasonable suspicion [or
it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
While the required level of suspicion is lower than the standard
required for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and
circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient
specific and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion. In
determining whether this objective standard has been met, the focus
necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately
before the stop. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at If 18, 998 P.2d 274
(citations and quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
Ibid, 2002 UT App 322,1J8, 57 P.3d 1098. More recently, this Court undertook a
further analysis of this issue, stating as follows:
11

A stop is justified if there is a reasonable suspicion that the
defendant is involved in criminal activity." State v. Case, 884 P.2d
1274, 1276, (Utah App.,1994), citing UTAH CODE ANN, § 77-7-15
(1990); see also, State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986)
(per curiam) (stating police must base reasonable suspicion on
objective facts indicating defendant's criminal activity). "While the
required level of suspicion is lower than the standard required for
probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances
approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific and
articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." Case, supra,
citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880; see United States v.
Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1
(1989); accord State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App.1994);
Sickling, 844 P.2d at 983.
In general, "[t]he specific and articulable facts required to support
reasonable suspicion are ... based on an investigating officer's own
observations and inferences." at 1276-77. Reasonable suspicion is 'a
particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the person stopped
of criminal activity," United States v. Tibbetts. 396 F.3d 1132,
1138,(10th Cir. 2005) and whether or not a detention is supported by
reasonable suspicion is determined by examining the totality of the
circumstances, not through an examination of each individual fact.
See State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95,f 38, 103 P.3d 699 (concluding that
the totality of the circumstances did not support a police officer's
warrantless search of the interior of an automobile for weapons). In
the case of a traffic stop, such an action is reasonable and the initial
seizure will be found to be sound if the defendant commits a traffic
offense in the officers presence, see State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at
t 30, 63 P.3d 650, or if the officer has an articulable reasonable
suspicion' that [the defendant has] violated any one of the multitude
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the
jurisdiction.'Tibbetts, 396 F.3d at 1137 (citation omitted).
State v. Yazzie 2005 UT App 261, f7, (Utah App.,2005). In Latta v. Kervte. our
10th Circuit Court of Appeals similarly analyzed an investigative detention and its
compliance with the Fourth Amendment by determining as follows:
[w]e must determine whether the officer has reasonable suspicion to
detain the individual. [Terry v.Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]. Reasonable suspicion "requires
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence, but something more than an inchoate and
19

unparticularized suspicion or hunch." United States v. MelendezGarcia 28 F.3d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir.1994) (internal quotations
omitted). The officer must be "able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio. 392
U.S. 1,21, 88 S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Ibid., 118 F.3d 693,699, (C.A.10 (N.M.) 1997).
"There is no bright line test for determining if reasonable suspicion exists.
State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991). Rather, courts must look at
the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109
S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Accord State v. Svkes. 840 P.2d 825,
827; Steward. 806 P.2d at 215. State v. Potter. 863 P.2d 40, (Utah App.,1993).
In the instant matter, once Rodriguez had stopped, he did not feel free to
leave the scene without speaking and complying with Adams' request. At the
hearing, Rodriguez and his wife testified as to how they felt when they were
stopped by Adams. Both Rodriguez and his wife testified that Adams waved to
them, which they perceived to be for them to stop, and made eye contact with
Rodriguez. Tr. at pp. 21 and 35. Rodriguez stated that, "[h]e made eye contact
with me right there and made a hand gesture — of stopping. It wasn't a hi how are
you, it was a stop movement." Tr. at p. 35. When asked what he was thinking
when he saw that hand gesture, defendant stated: "I was thinking I was being
stopped. It was apparent to me that the hand gesture and the angle of the vehicle
was, was a forceful..." Tr. at p. 35. Defendant rolled down his window about
seven inches or so and said, "We're okay I just stopped for some water." At that
point he just continued to stare at me. And exited his vehicle very quickly and
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grabbed a hold of my door, opened it up and told me to step out of the vehicle. Tr.
at p. 37.
This evidence was presented in Rodriguez's opening brief to show that,
based upon the totality of the circumstances, Rodriguez did not feel free to leave
once they received the visual signal from Adams, and additionally for fear of other
criminal repercussions codified at UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6a-210.

Brief of

Appellant at p. 17. Rodriguez is not challenging the trial court's determination of
Adams credibility, but rather is merely showing how Rodriguez and his wife felt
in order to show that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the
scene. In order for this Court to know how Rodriguez and his wife were feeling it
was necessary for Rodriguez to reiterate the testimony given at the hearing
because there was no other evidence presented that would have shown how they
felt.
Rodriguez does not challenge the trial court's determination that he and his
wife were less credible than the Adams in this matter, instead they were simply
using the totality of the circumstances test and their testimony to show that they
did not feel free to leave the scene once Adams used a visual signal to stop them.
Adams then engaged them in conversation and ultimately ordered Rodriguez out
of the vehicle. Any person in this matter would not feel that they were free to just
walk away, particularly when a police officer provides you with a visual signal to
stop, rolls down his window, engages in conversation with the driver, and then
asks the driver to step out of the vehicle. Rodriguez was merely using the totality
14

of the circumstances and his testimony to evidence how a reasonable person would
not feel like they could just walk awayfromAdams.
Although the trial court concluded that the stop of Rodriguez was not a
level two (2) stop, the trial court failed to undertake an examination as to the
totality of the circumstances in this matter. For an encounter to rise to a level two
(2) Terry stop, a reasonable person must feel like they are not free to just walk
away from the detention. In this matter, given the totality of the circumstances
and the testimony of Rodriguez about how he was feeling after he stopped, it is
clear that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.
Rodriguez's travel had been blocked by Adams crossing their land of
traffic, Adams had given Rodriguez a visual signal, Adams' window was rolled
down, he engaged Rodriguez in conversation, and got out of his vehicle to
continuing speaking with Rodriguez. A reasonable person in this situation would
not feel free to leave. If a police officer approaches a person, gives them a visual
signal, has their window rolled down, begins speaking to them, and then exits their
vehicle to continue talking to them, that person is not going to feel like they can
just end the conversation and leave, but rather they will likely feel as though they
must finish speaking to the officer. The encounter in this matter became a level
two (2) stop because Rodriguez did not feel like he could just leave the scene and
disregard Adams' visual signals to stop.

Based upon the totality of the

circumstances and because Rodriguez did not feel like he could just leave the
encounter was a level two (2) stop.
15

Appellant agrees with all findings of fact presented in this matter and
merely challenges the trial court's conclusions of law in this matter. Based upon
the totality of the circumstances in this matter, a seizure of Rodriguez by Adams
occurred. Where a seizure occurs, a level two (2) Tecry encounter occurs, The
trial court erroneously determined that the encounter between Rodriguez and
Adams in this matter was a level one (1) Tsnx stop negating the need for
reasonable suspicion on Adams part for the stop that was conducted.

The

evidence as found by the trial court clearly indicates that this was a level two (2)
encounter and that such encounter thus necessitated a finding with respect to
whether reasonable suspicion existed. Rodriguez lias argued in bis upaoing brief
and supra herein m favor of a finding that no reasonable suspicion existed at the
time of the stop and that the evidence obtained as a result thereof should have been
suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Rodriguez respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's Judgment, and enter such other andfartherrelief
it deems necessary.
DATKD THIS V?* day or June, 2007.

Rodriguez
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